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ABSTRACT 
 
Background: In the context of fiscal austerity in many European welfare states, policy 
innovation often takes the form of “social investment,” a contested set of policies aimed at 
strengthening labor markets. Social investment policies include employment subsidies, skills 
training and job-finding services, early childhood education and childcare, and parental leave. 
Given that such policies can influence gender-equity in the labor market, we analyzed the 
possible effects of such policies on gender health equity.  
Methods: Using age- and sex-stratified data from the Global Burden of Disease Study on 
cardiovascular disease (CVD) morbidity and mortality between 2005 and 2010, we estimated 
linear regression models of policy indicators on employment supports, childcare, and parental 
leave with country fixed effects. 
Findings: We found mixed effects of social investment for men versus women. Whereas 
government spending on early childhood education and childcare was associated with lower 
CVD mortality rates for both men and women equally, government spending on paid parental 
leave was more strongly associated with lower CVD mortality rates for women. Additionally, 
government spending on public employment services was associated with lower CVD mortality 
rates for men but was not significant for women, while government spending on employment 
training was associated with lower CVD mortality rates for women but not for men.  
Conclusions: Social investment policies were negatively associated with CVD mortality, but the 
ameliorative effects of specific policies were gendered. We discuss the implications of these 
results for the European social investment policy turn and for future research on gender health 
equity.  
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SUMMARY BOX 
 
What is already known on this subject? 
 
The European Commission advocates that its member states adopt a social investment 
strategy, referring to a contested set of government regulations, programs, and expenditures that 
together they expect to promote a more equitable and productive labor force. Specifically, 
several European welfare states adopted new policies and raised spending to support paid 
parental leave, public childcare for young children, job training programs to facilitate re-entry 
into the paid labor market after leave or unemployment, and public employment services to 
match the short- and long-term unemployed to job vacancies. While many of these policies have 
been shown to promote gender-equity in labor force participation and earnings, their effects for 
population health and gender health equity in particular are largely unknown.  
 
What does this study add?  
 
This study examined associations of these policies with cardiovascular disease morbidity 
and mortality among working-age men and women. This study found that social investment 
policies were marginally associated with lower cardiovascular disease mortality, but that these 
associations differed for men and women, with mixed implications for gender-equity in 
cardiovascular disease. The study points to future research on the implications of the social 
investment turn for gender health equity. 
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BACKGROUND 
 
Many European states adopted or strengthened family and employment policies that 
reflect a social investment approach, referring to government regulations, programs, and 
expenditures designed to improve workers’ human capital and productivity and to consequently 
improve labor markets and economic growth.[1,2] Social investment advocates argue welfare 
states should move from an expensive and compensating social safety net and introduce cost-
efficient and capacitating interventions.[1] This approach adheres to three principles: to enact 
policies that invest in human capital; to enact policies that help reconcile work and family; and to 
target enacted policies toward traditionally socially excluded groups, including the young and 
old, racial and ethnic minorities, and women. Advocates argue these policies improve gender-
equity, but critics contend paid parental leaves may still reinforce traditional gender norms or 
even discourage return to employment, and public employment services may benefit men 
disproportionately given occupational sex segregation and pay differentials.[3,4]  
 Nevertheless, effects of social investment policies are only beginning to be assessed.[5] 
One area that has not received attention is population health: social investment policies seek to 
enhance gender-equity in European labor markets, but what effects are they having on the health 
of men and women? This paper examines whether social investment policies in the areas of 
parental leave, early childhood education and childcare, and employment services differentially 
affect the health of women and men, and in so doing, inadvertently affect gender-equity.  
Cardiovascular disease (CVD) in particular responds to employment and working 
conditions, which these social investment policies are designed to support. Since the first 
Whitehall study showed employment rank was strongly associated with CVD morbidity,[6] 
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decades of scholarship established a close connection between CVD and employment.[7] CVD is 
the leading cause of death in the majority of wealthy countries, accounting for almost 40% of 
total deaths annually.[8] In the European Union in 2017, CVD accounted for 22% of total deaths 
under age 65.[9]  
There is substantial cross-national variation in CVD,[10,11] and differences cannot be 
explained by differences in social and demographic distributions, individual behaviours, or the 
environment.[12] As a result, scholars have called for research that investigates social policy as a 
potential root cause of CVD risk factors and outcomes.[13]  
CVD is also highly gendered within and between countries. Men have higher CVD rates; 
however, due to higher female life expectancy, the average patient receiving treatment for CVD 
is female.[14] Additionally, while CVD rates are declining on average, the decline has slowed or 
even stalled amongst women,[9] especially where high job demands are coupled with traditional 
gender norms of care-work and low levels of support for work-family reconciliation.[12]  
Gender differences in CVD mask the more general paradox. In high-income countries, 
men have shorter life expectancies and higher mortality rates across almost all causes of death 
and age-groups.[15] And yet, women—despite their lower mortality rates—report higher 
physical and mental morbidity across many surveys and multiple measures: “women get sick, 
men die.”[16,17]  
Explanations for this paradox focus on variations in the behaviour of men and women, 
including those linked to constructions of masculinity and work-family role strain.[18,19] Men 
are more likely to engage in risk-taking behaviours such as excessive alcohol consumption.[20] 
They are also less likely to access healthcare services and more likely to present late with 
symptoms.[21] Further, psychosocial theories of health suggest men have been more exposed to 
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negative health effects from workplace hierarchies, persistent unemployment, and the need to be 
the main breadwinner—all factors associated with an increased risk of CVD.[7,22] Women in 
comparison are more likely to experience physical and mental health problems as a result of 
work-family strain.[18,19,23,24] They are also more likely to be single parents, to report un- or 
under-employment due to family responsibilities, or to be precariously employed,[25] which 
have been linked to health sequelae.[26,27] 
We propose that CVD is mitigated by the social investment approach in gendered 
ways:[28]  
 
 (1) Consistent with literature on work-family strain, we hypothesize that parental leave 
and early childhood education and childcare policies are more strongly associated with 
lower CVD morbidity and mortality for women compared to men because women are 
still more likely to be primary caregivers.[18,19,23,24]  
 (2) We hypothesize that active labor market policies will have more mixed effects 
because while women are often further removed from the labor market due to caring 
responsibilities, previous studies found a stronger association between unemployment, 
economic inactivity, and poor health for men compared to women.[22]  
o (2a) In particular, we hypothesize that employment training programs and hiring 
incentives will benefit women relative to men given recent evidence of their 
gendered effects on labor market outcomes.[25,29]  
o (2b) We also hypothesize that spending on public employment services and 
administrative costs, including unemployment centers and job-finding services, 
would instead benefit men more than women as recent research found that both 
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men and women benefit from job search services, though men usually more 
so.[3,4,cf. 29]  
 
As an initial test of these hypotheses, we modelled CVD morbidity and mortality as a 
function of six social investment policy indicators in 13 European countries for the 2005-2010 
period. We draw from research documenting the beneficial effects of government social 
spending on health.[30,31] However, to our knowledge, this is the first study to assess gender 
differences in the association between CVD and social investment policies using data 
disaggregated by age and sex.[cf. 32] 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
Sample  
 
We built a dataset that includes age- and sex-specific morbidity and mortality rates, and 
indicators of social investment in the areas of parental leave, early childhood education and 
childcare, and employment services. We examined whether changes in social investment 
indicators are associated with changes in CVD mortality and years lived with disability (YLD) 
between 2005 and 2010 in 13 European countries: Austria; Belgium; Denmark; Finland; France; 
Germany; Ireland; Italy; Netherlands; Norway; Sweden; Switzerland; and the United Kingdom. 
We were limited to the 2005-2010 period because of data availability on our social investment 
indicators. Because social investment policies are targeted toward young families, working-age 
people, and adults nearing retirement age, we excluded those under the age of 25 and over the 
age of 64.  
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CVD Morbidity and Mortality 
 
We used data from the 2015 Global Burden of Disease Study (GBD).[10,33] The GBD 
CVD cause-group includes rheumatic and ischemic heart disease, cerebrovascular disease or 
aneurysm, hypertension, cardiomyopathy and myocarditis, atrial fibrillation and flutter, 
peripheral artery disease, and endocarditis. Rates were estimated separately for men and women 
in five-year age-groups for each year and country. YLD rate estimates were provided for every 
five years whereas mortality rate estimates are provided for every year. YLD rates were 
estimated by GBD using disease-specific prevalence multiplied by disability weights. Rates were 
reported per 100,000 persons. Figure 1 displays the age standardized CVD YLD and mortality 
rates by sex and country.  
 
[Figure 1] 
 
Social Investment Policy Indicators 
 
We do not engage the debate of which policies constitute the social investment 
approach,[cf. 34] but focus on those with the greatest documented effects on gender-equity: 
parental leave, early childhood education and childcare, and active labor market policies.[cf. 35] 
We used six social investment policy indicators from two different sources. All are publicly-
available. Table 1 describes the six social investment policy indicators and gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita for all 13 countries.  
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First, we used public and mandatory private spending indicators from the OECD Social 
Expenditure Database within two policy areas related to our hypotheses: family and active labor 
market policies. We used five indicators measured using per capita at constant (2010) Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP) rates in US dollars, including: early childhood education and childcare 
(ECEC); maternity and parental leave; public employment services (PES) and administration; 
employment training; and private sector employment incentives, including subsidies for private 
sector hiring and workers’ mobility allowances. Second, we used a paid parental leave full-time 
equivalent (FTE) measure from the Social Policy Indicators’ Parental Leave Benefit Dataset, 
calculated as the total maternal, paternal, and dual post-delivery weeks paid leave multiplied by 
the weekly net replacement rate for the average production workers’ wage. This results in a 
summary measure of family-leave generosity that captures both the percentage of wages that can 
be replaced by family benefits, as well as the duration of such benefits.[36]  
 
[Table 1] 
 
Estimation 
 
We estimated the association of each social investment indicator using separate linear 
regressions, given the overlap among the measures, and the fact that our study is an initial 
exploration. The correlations between the indicators are shown in the appendix. We estimated 
standardized beta coefficients. We controlled for gender and age and age-by-gender interactions. 
Because it may be associated with health and the capacity for social investment, we controlled 
for the log of expenditure-based real GDP in 2005 US dollars at chained PPP rates per capita 
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from the Penn World Table Version 8.1.[37] To test the association for men versus women, we 
included policy indicator-by-gender interactions. The policy indicators and GDP were lagged 
one year.  
The observations were age-by-sex-by-country-by-year aggregate estimates. We limited 
our analysis to countries and years for which each indicator was available. For YLD models, this 
was 416 age-by-sex-by-country-by-year observations for years 2005 and 2010. For mortality 
models, this was 1,248 age-by-sex-by-country-by-year observations for all years between 2005 
and 2010.  
A motivation for cross-national analysis is to learn how policymakers shape health equity 
through social policy, but a major limitation of such analysis is national societies differ in more 
ways than can be incorporated into statistical analysis. To address this unmeasured 
heterogeneity, all models included country fixed-effects that leverage these panel data to 
“control” for cross-national differences that are unmeasured but can be assumed to have effects 
that are stable over time such as language, relative population sizes, and religious norms about 
family formation.[38]  
 
RESULTS 
 
The coefficients of interest, the main effect of the social investment indicator and its 
interaction with gender, are shown in Tables 2 and 3. The full models are in the appendix. The 
association between the policy indicator and the health outcome for men is represented by the 
main effect of the policy indicator since men are the omitted category. The association between 
the policy indicator and the health outcome for women is the sum of the main effect of the policy 
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indicator and the policy-by-gender interaction term. The last column displays the two-sided p-
value from a Chow test of this association for women.  
Table 2 displays estimates of interest for YLD. This table appears to show government 
spending on employment incentives, ECEC, and parental leave was more strongly associated 
with lower YLD rates among women. However, Chow tests of these effects were not statistically 
significant.  
 
[Table 2] 
 
Table 3 displays estimates of interest for mortality. An increase in government spending 
on employment training programs and the number of eligible weeks FTE paid leave were 
associated with lower CVD mortality for women. The magnitude of these associations was 
small. Using the standardized beta coefficients for government spending on employment training 
programs, the results show that a standard deviation increase in spending—equivalent to $65.07 
per capita (Table 1)—was associated with a -0.056 ((-0.003)+(-0.053)) change in the standard 
deviation of the CVD mortality rate—equivalent to 88.94 deaths per 100,000—corresponding to 
4.98 fewer deaths per 100,000 women. These results confirmed our hypotheses that women 
benefit, but did not confirm our hypotheses that women benefit more. 
An increase in government spending on PES and administration was associated with 
lower CVD mortality for men. Similarly, the magnitude was small. A standard deviation increase 
in spending—equivalent to $36.81 per capita (Table 1)—was associated with a -0.069 change in 
the standard deviation of the CVD mortality rate, corresponding to 6.14 fewer deaths per 
100,000 men. Additionally, an increase in government spending for ECEC was associated with 
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lower mortality for both men and women. A standard deviation increase in spending—equivalent 
to $161.94 per capita (Table 1)—was associated with a -0.104 change for men and a -0.094 ((-
0.104)+(0.011)) change for women in the standard deviation of the CVD mortality rate, 
corresponding to 9.25 fewer deaths for men and 8.27 fewer deaths for women per 100,000. 
These results partially confirmed our hypotheses since we did not find gender differences in the 
associations.  
Finally, the results show that an increase in government spending on paid maternity and 
parental leave was associated with lower mortality for men and women, and the association was 
greater among women. These results were larger in magnitude, though the difference in the 
effect between genders, while statistically significant, remained small. A standard deviation 
increase in spending equivalent to $110.4 per capita (Table 1) was associated with a -0.267 
change for men and a -0.306 ((-0.267)+(-0.039)) change for women in the standard deviation of 
the CVD mortality rate, corresponding to 23.75 fewer deaths for men and 27.22 fewer deaths for 
women per 100,000.These results confirmed our hypotheses that women benefit more than men.  
 
[Table 3] 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The beneficial effects of compensatory social policies on health are well-established, both 
in terms of specific programs and in terms of social expenditure differences across types of 
welfare states.[39–41] This article follows from current policy debates and extends previous 
research by drawing attention to health effects of capacitating social investment policies 
similarly not explicitly designed to increase well-being. We hypothesized that family and active 
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labor market policy measures would have differential health effects for men and women and 
thereby influence gender health equity. We found mixed results in terms of who benefits from 
social investment policies and our hypotheses were only partially supported. 
On the one hand, women clearly benefit. Government spending on employment training 
and on maternity and parental leave in addition to the number of eligible weeks FTE paid 
parental leave were associated with decreased CVD mortality for women. However, leave 
expenditures had a greater effect for women while training expenditures and weeks paid leave 
had no effect on the mortality experienced by men and so these aspects of social investment 
potentially increase gender-inequity in CVD mortality. These findings were as expected in terms 
of how these policies are beneficial for women who traditionally had the main care burden for 
young children and who are more likely to take parental leave and need to reenter the labor 
force.[25,29] However, the magnitude of the effects was quite small. 
On the other hand, men also benefit. Government spending on PES and administration 
was associated with lower mortality for men, but this association was insignificant for women, 
potentially leading to greater gender-equity in CVD mortality. Additionally, government 
spending on ECEC benefited both men and women with no statistical gender difference in the 
association, resulting in no effect on gender-equity. These findings were somewhat expected in 
terms of our hypothesis on the effects of government spending on PES and administration; 
previous studies found that men experience greater benefit from the services included in this 
spending category.[29] However, the effect for women was insignificant and we cannot conclude 
whether men in fact benefit more. The findings for ECEC deviate from our hypothesis that 
women would benefit more and requires further exploration. 
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For ECEC indicators, it is possible men benefit from increased household earnings due to 
increased labor force attachment facilitated by children being supervised outside the home in 
childcare or pre-school. Additionally, while childcare provision effectively increased women’s 
participation in paid work,[42] as a result they are then subject to the dual burden of both work 
and care.[43] Further, mothers are disproportionately likely to be employed part-time across 
Europe and so whilst their labor market activity rates increase as a result of childcare, their 
average earnings are lower than men’s, contributing to the gender-pay gap.[44]  
 While these results provide initial evidence of our hypotheses, more research is needed 
using micro-level longitudinal data with finer-grained detail on social benefit eligibility and take-
up and on physical and mental health outcomes, including more proximal CVD risk factors such 
as smoking and alcohol consumption or psychological stress. Future work should also analyze 
the life course timing of exposure to social investment policies, which are heterogeneous in their 
target age-groups.[1,2,34] We note that men and women in older age-groups in these analyses—
where mortality rates are significantly higher—will not have benefited as much from social 
investment policies as those in younger age-groups due to their age and the recency of these 
policy innovations.[34,45]  
We further acknowledge that the rise of more active welfare policies in the form of social 
investment have coincided with the decrease in more passive forms of welfare – including 
reductions in out of work benefits and stronger restrictions placed on their receipt.[7] The 
recommodification of the traditional welfare state has accompanied social investment with some 
documented negative consequences for population health, including socio-economic health 
inequalities.[46] It is possible that gender health equity is also influenced by these dual processes 
of investment and retrenchment, and this should be explored in future research.  
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Limitations 
 
We interpret the results with caution in light of the limitations. First, we were restricted in 
the number of years of data we could include in the analysis because the social investment 
approach is relatively new, and because the creation of comparable policy indicators follows the 
establishment of relevant policies by several years. In future work, we will extend our analysis as 
data become available. 
 Second, we use observational data, and so our analyses are vulnerable to several threats 
to causal inference. We argue that year-to-year changes in social investment effort by the welfare 
state is plausibly exogenous to year-to-year changes in CVD morbidity and mortality because 
labor-market conditions exist outside and prior to individuals’ entry into employment, and 
because labor-market programs have been shown to affect individuals’ labor market attachment. 
Nevertheless, we cannot rule out all forms of endogeneity. 
 Third, while our models control for several predictors of CVD, a broader range of control 
covariates would strengthen our inferences. Unfortunately, few controls are available from the 
GBD data, but in our ongoing work we use individual-level data to address other forms of 
confounding. Still, we emphasize that our fixed-effects estimates can be interpreted as net of 
very general ceteris paribus conditions, where between-country differences that do not change 
over time in their levels or in their effects are held constant.  
 Fourth, we use data aggregated into age-by-sex-by-country-by-year categories, which 
means that we cannot draw inferences about processes or associations at the individual level. For 
the present paper, we note that an aggregated approach fits with our overarching aim of 
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evaluating effects of social investment policies for gender health equity—an inherently 
aggregated question. 
 Fifth, we note the results for CVD morbidity were insignificant, but caution interpreting 
the differences in these results from those for mortality. Unlike the GBD mortality estimates, the 
YLD estimates are calculated using disease-specific prevalence and disability weights, which 
allow for an estimate of disease burden that is sensitive to differences in the conditions captured 
by the GBD CVD category.[47] Critics have questioned the disability weights methodology, 
which might contribute to measurement error in the dependent variable, increasing the 
imprecision in our morbidity estimates.[48] Future work using individual-level data will examine 
effects of social investment policies on specific CVD risk factors and morbidities.  
Sixth, since the data are cross-sectional, we are unable to explore the possibility that the 
identified associations may vary by the timing of exposure or accumulate over the length of 
exposure. We view our estimates as conservative, since the immediate effects of social 
investment should be smaller than the accumulated long-term and asynchronous effects of 
sensitive-periods. However, these estimates offer important insights for CVD among working-
age populations, among whom it is a leading cause of morbidity and mortality.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Many European governments have enhanced citizenship rights and committed substantial 
spending in the domains of paid parental leaves, early childhood education and childcare, and 
employment services.[1,2] Advocates of social investment policies argue they enhance gender-
equity by enhancing female labor market power and reducing the gendered burden of care-
work.[49] We contribute to debate surrounding social investment policies by exploring their 
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implications for the cardiovascular health of women and men and corresponding gender health 
equity. We advance a recent turn in social epidemiology toward social policy and institutional 
factors in explaining the distribution of population health.[50] We found social investment 
policies are associated with reduced mortality for women and men, but these effects are small 
and not enough to explain CVD burden. Future work should use individual-level data to estimate 
their effects on specific outcomes and target populations. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1: Macro-Level Measures of Social Investment and GDP, 13 European Welfare 
States, 2005-2010 
 
Country Indicator  Mean SD Min. Max. 
      
All  PES and Administration Spending 91.16 36.81 31.07 164.87 
 Employment Incentive Spending 53.94 50.4 4.35 204.1 
 Training Spending 115.1 65.07 6.01 274.56 
 ECEC Spending 315.04 161.94 113.08 710.8 
 Weeks FTE Paid Leave 18.06 12.16 5.85 52 
 Paid Leave Spending 132.08 110.44 0 384.41 
 Expenditure-Based Real GDP per Capita  35631.02 5416.47 28351.94 53772.11 
      
Austria PES and Administration Spending 69.3 3.58 64.51 74.09 
 Employment Incentive Spending 21.76 0.98 20.46 23.07 
 Training Spending 168.69 31.76 126.25 211.12 
 ECEC Spending 151.8 28.97 113.08 190.51 
 Weeks FTE Paid Leave 31.31 15.48 10.63 52 
 Paid Leave Spending 60.03 2.83 56.26 63.81 
 Expenditure-Based Real GDP per Capita  35635.65 1277.5 33467.19 36903.02 
      
Belgium PES and Administration Spending 77.7 4.02 72.34 83.07 
 Employment Incentive Spending 63.06 8.75 51.36 74.75 
 Training Spending 61.94 0.16 61.73 62.15 
 ECEC Spending 247.2 11.56 231.76 262.65 
 Weeks FTE Paid Leave 10.44 0.78 9.39 11.49 
 Paid Leave Spending 81.73 5.79 73.98 89.47 
 Expenditure-Based Real GDP per Capita  33785.8 1291.92 31930.79 35519.02 
      
Denmark PES and Administration Spending 137.64 4.78 131.24 144.03 
 Employment Incentive Spending 114.54 11.3 99.44 129.65 
 Training Spending 241.99 24.37 209.43 274.56 
 ECEC Spending 542.5 16.24 520.8 564.2 
 Weeks FTE Paid Leave 10 0 10 10 
 Paid Leave Spending 235.16 0.89 233.97 236.34 
 Expenditure-Based Real GDP per Capita  34589.99 1536.43 32133.67 36154.02 
      
Finland PES and Administration Spending 64.07 1.01 62.72 65.42 
 Employment Incentive Spending 51.77 3.81 46.67 56.87 
 Training Spending 167.66 20.34 140.48 194.85 
 ECEC Spending 367.1 21.87 337.88 396.32 
 Weeks FTE Paid Leave 22.74 11.03 8 37.48 
 Paid Leave Spending 254.03 17.27 230.95 277.1 
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Country Indicator  Mean SD Min. Max. 
 Expenditure-Based Real GDP per Capita  32535.48 1687.65 30167.14 34755.36 
      
France PES and Administration Spending 93.96 9.68 81.02 106.9 
 Employment Incentive Spending 29.94 4.34 24.13 35.74 
 Training Spending 116.73 11.69 101.11 132.34 
 ECEC Spending 425.92 0.28 425.54 426.3 
 Weeks FTE Paid Leave 10.82 1.44 8.9 12.75 
 Paid Leave Spending 113.76 5.22 106.78 120.74 
 Expenditure-Based Real GDP per Capita  30672.3 956.98 29177.58 31502.98 
      
Germany PES and Administration Spending 133.04 14.25 113.99 152.09 
 Employment Incentive Spending 28.42 6.5 19.73 37.11 
 Training Spending 128.94 14.35 109.76 148.12 
 ECEC Spending 161.84 16.76 139.45 184.24 
 Weeks FTE Paid Leave 33.47 0.06 33.4 33.55 
 Paid Leave Spending 101.72 9.93 88.45 114.99 
 Expenditure-Based Real GDP per Capita  32488.73 1310.19 30482.34 33888.9 
      
Ireland PES and Administration Spending 63.15 7.77 52.76 73.54 
 Employment Incentive Spending 23.02 0.14 22.84 23.2 
 Training Spending 148.76 27.81 111.59 185.92 
 ECEC Spending 167.72 31.26 125.94 209.49 
 Weeks FTE Paid Leave 11.53 0.08 11.42 11.64 
 Paid Leave Spending 60.12 18.4 35.53 84.71 
 Expenditure-Based Real GDP per Capita  38852.1 2831.25 35977.13 43383.89 
      
Italy PES and Administration Spending 33.4 1.75 31.07 35.73 
 Employment Incentive Spending 62.06 8.41 50.83 73.3 
 Training Spending 60.25 7.49 50.24 70.25 
 ECEC Spending 180.67 0.16 180.45 180.89 
 Weeks FTE Paid Leave 6.44 0.38 5.93 6.95 
 Paid Leave Spending 63.03 1.35 61.22 64.84 
 Expenditure-Based Real GDP per Capita  29765.58 961.28 28351.94 31006.19 
      
Netherlands PES and Administration Spending 162.17 2.01 159.48 164.87 
 Employment Incentive Spending 8.38 0.81 7.3 9.46 
 Training Spending 52.87 3.11 48.72 57.02 
 ECEC Spending 282.2 70.64 187.8 376.59 
 Weeks FTE Paid Leave 6.12 0.2 5.85 6.39 
 Paid Leave Spending 0 0 0 0 
 Expenditure-Based Real GDP per Capita  36657.05 1692.4 34022.23 38562.1 
      
Norway PES and Administration Spending 72.42 1.78 70.04 74.8 
 Employment Incentive Spending 60.31 1.11 58.83 61.78 
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Country Indicator  Mean SD Min. Max. 
 Training Spending 169.38 32.81 125.54 213.22 
 ECEC Spending 579.86 97.99 448.92 710.8 
 Weeks FTE Paid Leave 41.5 1.12 40 43 
 Paid Leave Spending 376.49 5.93 368.57 384.41 
 Expenditure-Based Real GDP per Capita  49536.11 2942.79 44994.75 53772.11 
      
Sweden PES and Administration Spending 98.36 11.18 83.42 113.3 
 Employment Incentive Spending 196.68 5.55 189.26 204.1 
 Training Spending 59.05 13.98 40.37 77.74 
 ECEC Spending 556.84 48.37 492.2 621.49 
 Weeks FTE Paid Leave 12.61 1.05 11.2 14.02 
 Paid Leave Spending 273.41 17.07 250.59 296.22 
 Expenditure-Based Real GDP per Capita  33937.13 1709.08 31354.64 35441.97 
      
Switzerland PES and Administration Spending 58.24 0.07 58.15 58.34 
 Employment Incentive Spending 36.93 0.53 36.22 37.64 
 Training Spending 113.16 7.95 102.54 123.78 
 ECEC Spending 147.44 2.92 143.53 151.35 
 Weeks FTE Paid Leave 25.26 1.19 23.67 26.86 
 Paid Leave Spending 47.53 8.09 36.71 58.34 
 Expenditure-Based Real GDP per Capita  41984.09 3062.22 37124.35 44781.87 
      
United 
Kingdom PES and Administration Spending 121.67 6.78 112.6 130.73 
 Employment Incentive Spending 4.36 0.01 4.35 4.38 
 Training Spending 6.93 0.69 6.01 7.86 
 ECEC Spending 284.38 4.01 279.02 289.73 
 Weeks FTE Paid Leave 12.58 0.85 11.44 13.72 
 Paid Leave Spending 50.1 9.31 37.66 62.53 
 Expenditure-Based Real GDP per Capita  32763.18 946.34 31181.47 33958.74 
 
Notes: Pooled data from 2005 to 2010. PES=public employment services. ECEC=early 
childhood education and childcare. FTE=full-time equivalent.  
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Table 2: Standardized Beta Coefficients for Effects of Social Investment Policy Indicators 
from Regression Models Predicting CVD YLD Rate per 100,000 in 13 European Countries, 
2005 and 2010 
 
Variables Standardized 
Beta 
Coefficient  Standard 
Error 
Chow Test  
P-Value 
PES and Administration Spending     
Indicator 0.001 0.007 0.136 0.596 
Women Indicator -0.014 -0.079 0.086  
Employment Incentive Spending     
Indicator 0.029 0.169 0.294 0.841 
Women  Indicator -0.036 -0.228*** 0.066  
Employment Training Spending     
Indicator -0.009 -0.036 0.074 0.586 
Women  Indicator -0.001 -0.004 0.049  
ECEC Spending     
Indicator 0.030 0.053 0.044 0.147 
Women  Indicator -0.079 -0.118*** 0.019  
Weeks Full-time Equivalent Paid Leave     
Indicator 0.0027 0.064 0.543 0.211 
Women  Indicator -0.029 -0.745** 0.278  
Paid Leave Spending  
  
 
Indicator -0.015 -0.040 0.125 0.101 
Women  Indicator -0.060 -0.166*** 0.028  
 
Notes: PES = public employment services; ECEC = early childhood education and childcare. 
The models are run on 416 age-by-sex-by-country-by-year observations. *** p<0.001, ** 
p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Table 3: Standardized Beta Coefficients for Effects of Social Investment Policy Indicators 
from Regression Models Predicting CVD Mortality Rate per 100,000 in 13 European 
Countries, 2005-2010 
 
Variables Standardized 
Beta 
Coefficient  Standard 
Error 
Chow Test  
P-Value 
PES and Administration Spending     
Indicator -0.069 -0.169** 0.063 0.162 
Women Indicator 0.047 0.081* 0.032  
Employment Incentive Spending     
Indicator -0.009 -0.018 0.132 0.861 
Women  Indicator 0.020 0.041+ 0.024  
Employment Training Spending     
Indicator -0.003 -0.004 0.036 0.052 
Women  Indicator -0.053 -0.066*** 0.019  
ECEC Spending     
Indicator -0.104 -0.059** 0.020 0.009 
Women  Indicator 0.011 0.005 0.008  
Weeks Full-time Equivalent Paid Leave     
Indicator -0.025 -0.199 0.152 0.038 
Women  Indicator -0.015 -0.118 0.105  
Paid Leave Spending  
  
 
Indicator -0.267 -0.217** 0.068 0.000 
Women  Indicator -0.039 -0.034** 0.011  
 
Notes: PES = public employment services; ECEC = early childhood education and childcare. 
The models are run on 1,248 age-by-sex-by-country-by-year observations. *** p<0.001, ** 
p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
